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Introduction
THE collapse of Lehman Brothers investment bank on September 15, 2008 marked a transformation of the international fi nancial crisis, which began in the American high risk mortgages market in the middle of 2007, 
into a systemic global crisis. On one side, the increase of aversion to risk and 
the absolute preference for liquidity in the principal advanced economies set in 
motion a generalized fl ight movement by quality global investors and the virtual 
interruption of foreign commercial credit lines, resulting in an abrupt devaluation 
of the currencies of various economies. On the other side, the strong retraction of 
economic activity of central economies associated with a move to reduced leveraging 
of the fi nancial system and of defl ation of assets translated into a reduction in 
dynamism of world commerce.
The purpose of this article is to present the impact of the international 
crisis in the Brazilian economy from a post-Keyneisan theoretical reference 
point, with an emphasis on the virtual paralysis of domestic banking credit after 
September 2008. The arguments are built on three interpretive hypotheses.
The fi rst is that, in the recent credit cycle, the competitive dynamic led to 
the emergence of high risk practices in the Brazilian banking system, such as term 
deposits with daily liquidity and loans to companies coupled to dollar derivative 
operations, whose destabilizing potential came to the surface when there was a 
reversal of expectations in the face of the escalation of the international fi nancial 
crisis and its contagion of peripheral economies, including Brazil. In other words, 
underestimation of risks that characterize banking activity at its peak phase 
increased the impact of the international crisis on the Brazilian economy.
Excessive prudence in the reversal phase is also intrinsically characteristic 
of profi t-making banking activities. However, in the case of Brazil, and this is 
the second hypothesis, the conservatism of the banks in the retraction phase was 
exacerbated by the relatively short credit term and by the existence of the pseudo-
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currency of  public bonds,  with liquidity and low risk profi tability, which allowed 
rapid reallocation of its portfolios. With the reversal of expectations associated 
with the escalation of the international crisis and its repercussions on the world 
economy, private banks reacted with excessive prudence, generating, in their 
movement to reallocate portfolios, strong retraction of credit, contributing to the 
rapid deceleration of economic activity. 
The third hypothesis is that the retraction of economic activity in the 
last quarter derived from the contraction of credit could have been mitigated 
if Brazil’s Central Bank (BCB) had, as in the example of the central banks of 
central economies, reacted, in an opportune manner, to the deterioration of the 
expectations of agents and to the “pooling of liquidity” in the inter-banking 
market. Stubbornly maintaining its mandate as guardian of stability and with 
an ambiguous diagnosis that the Brazilian economy was growing beyond its 
potential, Central Bank as the monetary authority failed to see the seriousness of 
the deceleration underway in the advanced economies and its implications for the 
Brazilian economy.
Competitive Dynamic and the Credit Cycle
In the capitalist economy, understood as the monetary economy of 
production, the banking system acts as a free agent in granting purchase power 
in anticipation of spending (in consumption and in investment). Besides their 
function of fi nancial intermediation banks create currency to grant credit, while 
being an integral part of the private institutional organization that is the vast 
hierarchical payment system which is organized around the Central Bank.
By creating currency rather than granting credit in order to meet their 
debts banks free society from the anchor of building a foreseeable resource 
and play a key role in the increase of the level of investments. However, banks 
act on the assumption of future expectations in a world or uncertainties and 
irreversibility. Thus when they expand credit they are acting according to 
their own considerations about the state of business, the performance of the 
economy and their prospects for profi tability and the risk of the recipients, 
requiring a “margin of guarantee” from them defi ned on the basis of the 
value of the collateral of the loans and the updated prospects for profi t of the 
business to be fi nanced.
While they are of a private and well-defi ned nature, banks are 
also innovative and dynamic companies in search of increase of profi ts. 
Subordination to the logic of the appreciation of wealth means that the banks 
are in competition amongst themselves and with other fi nancial institutions to 
gain market power and greater profi ts in different fi nancial markets, whether 
domestic or international.2 The competitive strategies adopted by banks in 
diligent administration of their assets and liabilities always have the objective 
of continually obtaining the greatest profi t possible, in an arrangement of 
profi tability with liquidity of fi nancial investments. However, there is no 
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guarantee that these strategies will be successful, since, as Keynes showed, 
economic decisions, owing to uncertainty, are always a risky bet in relation to 
the future. In this way, bank activism “affects not only the volume and the 
distribution of fi nances, but also the cyclical behavior of prices, income and 
employment” (Minsky, 1986, p.226).
The implacable search for appreciation of wealth, in a world of uncertainty 
and irreversibility, causes banks to neither respond passively nor to the demand 
or preference of other agents for loans and banking investments not under the 
command of Central Bank. In certain circumstances, this latter, which occupies 
the top of the monetary hierarchy, can have its objective of generating economic 
liquidity thwarted by strategies adopted by banks in the administration of their 
assets and liabilities for the purpose of increasing profi t, looking to reconcile 
profi tability with liquidity of their fi nancial investments. The banks can do as 
much to make matters diffi cult as they can to concretize the decision of the 
monetary authority in amplifying liquidity conditions as in restraining liquidity 
activity. In the fi rst case, they can make use of additional reserves for purely 
fi nancial transactions without impacting monetary income, causing a repression of 
liquidity, which can compromise businesses not only by non-fi nancial economic 
agents, but also smaller scale banks. In the second case, as highlighted by Minsky 
(1984, 1986), banks can develop new fi nancial instruments that, at least partially, 
can replace restrictions placed on monetary assets. 
As with all other capitalist economic agents, banks have a preference 
for liquidity and future expectations, to which they direct their strategies in an 
incessant quest for appreciation. In this sense, they actively manage both sides 
of the balance sheet and also use expedients such as off-the-books transactions. 
Since the desire of banks to maintain liquidity depends on optimistic or 
pessimistic considerations for the state of business throughout the economic 
cycle, the evolution of credit above all has to be pro-cyclical, as if the banking 
system were essentially constituted of private for-profi t institutions. 
The expectations of banks on the state of business throughout the 
economic cycle can lead to the assumption of excessive risk, to fi nancing of 
speculative activities and/or to rationing of credit, with adverse effects on 
economic growth. Thus, throughout periods of optimistic expectations, banks 
pressured by competition grant credit without requiring insured guarantees, 
while debtors pay their debts by the assumption of new debts. The expansion of 
indebtedness then becomes similar to underestimated risks. This is because, in the 
incessant quest for appreciation, a bank that adopts more prudent behavior vis-à-
vis its rivals risks losing market share. 
Continual refi nancing of previous debts with reduction in the margins 
of security of the contracts makes possible the appearance of unstable assets 
throughout the economic cycle. According to the fi nancial instability hypothesis 
formulated by Minsky, the instability emerges to the extent that the fl ow of 
expected income is no longer suffi cient to cover committed obligations when 
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the innovations favored the increase in investments and profi t, whether from the 
frustration of expectations, or from equally unexpected interest rates. 
By contrast, when expectations degenerate, the banks have to shrink 
the granting of credit, reducing amounts and terms, raising interest and 
guarantee requirements. In the same way that there is excessive assumption of 
risk by banks at their peak phase when they look to expand their market share, 
caution in the reversal phase is intrinsically characteristic of profi t-making bank 
activities. However, by contracting, reducing, or not renewing credit lines, banks 
contribute to the fi nancial fragility of their clients, generating a vicious cycle of 
increasing default and aversion to risk. In certain circumstances, banks decide to 
strongly ration credit, braking economic growth or even leading to regression of 
production and investments. 
As Keynes showed in one of his articles about the crisis of 1929, banks 
can behave myopically when pessimistic expectations predominate. In such 
circumstances, bankers look to reduce their exposure to risk in a manner so 
abrupt that, without warning, they threaten their own solidity, given that such 
an attitude can lead to the failure of their debtors. This myopia is at the base of 
a vicious circle of increase of default and defl ation of debts and prices of assets 
(Keynes, 1973).
In order to limit the inherent instability of the banking system, authorities 
seek to impose rules of caution for the functioning of banks, which are applied to 
the composition and quality of credit and on the levels of indebtedness, among 
others. However, with fi nancial innovations, the banks try to cheat any and 
every control. The new instruments and procedures contribute to expanding 
the complexity of the fi nancial structures and the relations between debtors 
and creditors. The result, as Minsky well points out, is the increase of economic 
instability.
Brazil’s Recent Credit Cycle
Since the adoption of the Real Plan in the middle of 1994, the competitive 
environment of the Brazilian banking system underwent an important 
transformation that translated into increased solidity of institutions and an 
advance in level of sophistication.3 Up to 2002, however, the system showed no 
change in how it acted in relation to the standard of the years of high infl ation, by 
maintaining a high preference for liquidity. With the exception of a short period 
of credit expansion after the Real Plan, banks continued prioritizing applications 
in public bonds vis-à-vis granting of credit. 
The present credit expansion cycle had its beginning shortly after the 
fi rst months of 2003, when banks began to expand credit offering to the private 
sector, in expectation of increasing their market share and their profi t margins.4 
This change in the composition of bank portfolios occurred when there was a 
combination of two elements: on the one side, confi rmation of a guarantee that 
there would not be a change in the economic policy of the new government; 
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on the other, reduced  macroeconomic volatility, resulting from the subsequent 
favorable improvement of foreign accounts in the international context, as 
much in terms of foreign commerce as in the liquidity conditions for peripheral 
countries. This scenario of reduced macroeconomic volatility and expectation of 
reduction in basic interest rates – and consequently reduction of earnings with 
treasury operations – induced banks to redefi ne their operational strategies, 
prioritizing credit expansion.
Banks identifi ed increase of credit to individuals as an enormous 
earning potential, in the face of optimistic expectations as to the recovery 
of jobs and income under the government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da 
Silva. For fi nancial institutions, credit to families is much easier to evaluate 
than company credit, which requires greater knowledge of business, fi nancial 
analysis and monitoring of the corporation’s activities. At the same time, since 
the interest rates for individual credit are higher, personal credit operations are 
also more profi table. 
Recovery of credit for individuals began before the fi rst signs of consumer 
purchase power recovery. The greater will to take on credit, even with its 
very high interest rates, refl ected, on the one hand, favorable expectations by 
consumers in relation to the future performance of the economy and, on the 
other, the need to update purchase of durable goods. Participation in credit by 
individuals in the totality of fi nancial system credit operations began to rise in 
2003, a tendency that was reinforced by the expansion of the amount of income 
after 2004 and which was maintained until 2007.
From the beginning of the expansion phase of the cycle the expansion 
of loans with free resources to individuals was anchored in the modalities of 
personal credit, vehicle acquisition and credit cards. Personal credit, which 
included operations with consigned credit, contributed on average to nearly half 
the growth of loans granted in this segment.5 A consigned credit mode offers 
banking institutions the advantage of punctual payment and the guarantee 
of debt service. In return the recipient obtains credit with interest rates much 
lower than those in other individual credit modalities. The lower cost of this 
credit mode allowed families to expand consumption, as well as to exchange 
debts, using the resources to end much higher cost fi nancing such as credit cards 
and special checks). It also exerted a great infl uence on the expansion of credit 
to individuals for acquisition of vehicles operations that offer the guarantee 
of fi duciary alienation. By allowing rapid recovery of goods, this mechanism 
reduces the credit risk and allows reduction of the risk premium covered by 
fi nancial institutions.
The willingness of families to expand their indebtedness was also 
stimulated by the strategy of large wholesale networks, soon imitated by banks 
and their fi nanciers, of stretching the terms of credit operations to the consumer. 
This stretching, signifi cantly reducing the value of installments, contributed to the 
reduction of default, above all in a scenario of increased income of the population 
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and, on a lesser scale, the increase of employment. The average term of individual 
operations rose from 308 days in January 2004 to 488 days in December 2008. 
This relative stretching of terms made possible the expansion of credit even in a 
scenario of extremely elevated average nominal (and real) interest rates. 
In 2008, with the rise in the level of economic activity and the continuity 
of increase in investment begun in 2007, operations in the company sector, in 
particular industrial companies, assumed leadership over expansion of private 
sector credit.6 Various inter-related factors contributed to the greater dynamism of 
credit with free resources. On the demand side, the acceleration of the Brazilian 
economy’s rhythm of growth after the second quarter of 2007 and its resulting 
stimulus to ongoing production decisions and the increase in productive capacity, 
requiring third-party resources, impelled more bank credit to be contracted, 
above all in the modality of working capital used for cash fl ow needs. 
In addition, various Brazilian companies and multinationals that counted 
on other fi nancing sources returned to the domestic bank credit market in 2008 
due to the continuing deepening of the international fi nancial crisis. The crisis 
resulted in an expected worsening in terms of cost and terms for fund raising by 
major companies (and banks) in the international market. Replacing, at least in 
part, their fund raising in the international market, large companies expanded 
loan contracts for working capital loans on the domestic market in increasing 
volume and longer terms.
A weakening of fi nancial conditions in the central economies, marked by 
strong defl ation of assets, also contributed to reduced dynamism in the Brazilian 
capital market, and in particular to a brutal retraction of the primary stock 
market. To cover losses in their home countries, investors shed their domestic 
market capital positions. The exit of these investors depressed response to initial 
public offerings (IPO) and additional issues.7
Two economic policy decisions aimed at slowing credit and decelerating 
the expansion of the economy to restrain infl ationary pressures contributed 
equally to the lesser domestic market dynamism of capital in 2008, raising 
companies’ costs for gaining issue of direct debt bonds. The fi rst of them was the 
January instituting of a compulsory deposit on leasing company bank deposits, 
which raised resources for its bank controllers through debenture issues. This 
requirement resulted in the retraction of debenture issues by leasing companies 
and increased competition between large banks for raising resources through 
term deposit certifi cates (CDB), which translated into a rise in the interest offered 
to clients and in the offering of daily liquidity for deposits up to two years after 
the initial term of two to three months.8 The interest increase of CDBs applied 
upward pressure to the interest rates of direct debt instruments issued by non-
fi nancial companies in the capital market, such as debentures and promissory 
notes, as well as increasing the prospecting costs by medium and small size banks.
The second measure, the rise in the SELIC rate after April, reinforced 
this dispute for resources in the domestic capital market. To increase the 
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profi tability of federal public bonds, the high interest rate provided a trigger for 
the reallocation of portfolios of fi nancial investments, notably of institutional 
investors, to the detriment of private debt shares and bonds, causing an increase 
in the costs of company and bank fundraising,  most of all for those of medium 
and small size. For smaller companies, resource fundraising through private bond 
issues became more diffi cult with the deterioration of international fi nancial 
conditions, given that, with the lack of foreign credit, the large Brazilian and 
multinational companies went on to acquire on the domestic market, increasing 
the competition for available resources. 
On the offering side, the greatest dynamism of the Brazilian economy, 
associated with the growth of the domestic market, stimulated the adoption by 
banking institutions of strategies of credit increase to the company sector, notably 
in terms of working capital. Thus, in the context of rise in the cost of acquisition 
of resources by companies in international and domestic capital markets, some 
banks went on to offer loans tied to operations with dollar derivatives under 
more favorable conditions. In these credit operations, banks offered resources to 
companies with double indexing: rates between 50% and 75% of Inter-banking 
Deposit (CDI) interest and exchange variation based on predetermined quotations. 
The relative stability of the exchange rate led banks and companies to underestimate 
the risk of these operations, which were offered to export and non-export 
companies of every size, construction companies and even medium size banks.9
This loan modality, introduced into the country by foreign investment 
banks, and rapidly diffused by private national banks, brought the potential 
for impacts from the fi nancial crisis into the Brazilian banking market. This is 
because, after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers investment bank in the middle 
of September, the strong increase in risk aversion created generalized fl ight by 
quality global investors and a virtual interruption of foreign lines of commercial 
credit, resulting in an abrupt defl ation of the currencies of various peripheral 
economies, among which was Brazil.10
Between 15 September and 15 October, the real depreciated 22.7%, 
bringing strong losses to Brazilian companies that had realized dollar derivative 
operations in the over-the-counter market in Brazil and abroad, whether as 
protection from exchange risk, or for speculative earnings, or to reduce the cost 
of bank loans. Thus, besides the impact of the crisis through the virtual paralysis 
of foreign lines of commercial credit, which compromised renewal of the Contract 
Exchange Advance (ACC) and reduced its terms,11 the banking credit market 
went on to suffer the effects of the problem of  liquidity “pooling” in domestic 
credit inter-banking, as will be seen in the following.
International Crisis and Liquidity Pooling of in the Brazilian 
Banking System
The systemic global crisis strongly affected the Brazilian economy as much 
in terms of foreign commerce as in fi nancial fl ow, including lines of commercial 
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credit.12  The freezing of inter-bank and international fi nancial markets and the 
abrupt devaluation of the real connected to the fl ight for security for foreign 
investors and the unraveling of operations with exchange derivatives accomplished 
by companies13 led to a rapid deterioration of bank expectations that reacted by 
narrowing credit and “pooling” liquidity.
Throughout 2008, the banks confronted growing diffi culty in renewing 
their foreign credit lines that maintained ACC operations. However, after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the interruption of credit concessions picked up 
with foreign resources in the domestic market, seriously affecting the fi nancing 
of Brazilian foreign commerce and requiring arrangements from the Federal 
Government to assure the furnishing of resources for this activity. 
The international crisis hit the Brazilian economy at a peak moment 
following completion of a sequence of six quarters of accelerated growth. In 
a context such as this, when companies produce more and new investments, 
banking credit is essential as much for the working capital as for expansion 
of production. When expectations reversed, banks reacted with an excess of 
prudence and vigorous retraction of credit, causing companies to review their 
production and investment plans. The result was a rapid deceleration of economic 
activity in the last quarter of the year.
Growing rumors about losses from exchange derivatives by companies 
and banks set in motion a movement of absolute risk aversion and preference for 
liquidity by the banks. From not knowing the degree of exposure of the many 
participants to the risk of losses in these operations, banks withdrew credit not 
only from other banks but also companies and individuals. This exacerbated 
reaction from the major Brazilian banks was facilitated by the existence of 
public bonds indexed to the basic interest rate, which made them even more 
attractive with the rise in the SELIC rate by BCB in September.14 The relatively 
short banking credit term in Brazil also favored this movement to portfolio 
reallocation, characteristic of active management of bank balance sheets. 
Even in the context of the escalation of the international crisis and the 
deterioration of credit conditions in the domestic market, however, loans for 
working capital continued growing, with a variation of 12.3% between September 
and December. An increment such as this within a scenario of contracting credit 
seems paradoxical. However, there are at least two explanations for this behavior. 
In the fi rst place, with paralysis of the international credit market, an increase in 
demand for banking credit by large companies occurred. This was the case with 
Petrobras, which at the end of October was authorized to raise up to eight billion 
reals on the domestic market in new loans to meet the fi nancing needs of ongoing 
investments.
In the second place, for contractual reasons the banks were obligated 
to expand the concession of loans to companies that incurred huge losses from 
exchange derivatives, whether for hedges, or for reduction of bank credit costs. 
Besides fi nancing the margin calls from the margin on the Commodities and 
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Futures Exchange (BM&F) for companies that were, on the basis of hedges, 
exchange derivative operations (IBRE, 2008), the banks rolled over and 
expanded lines of credit to the companies to which they had given loans based on 
options and dollar swaps.
Small and medium size banks were the most affected by the “pooling” 
of liquidity, since they lacked a large base of depositors and depended on the 
fundraising from inter-bank resources and availability of credit in order to provide 
continuity for their active operations.15 Since the major banks ceased acquiring 
vehicle fi nancing and consigned credit portfolios from smaller banks, credit 
concessions in these market segments were strongly affected.
The largest private banks, like Itaú and Unibanco, which conducted 
exchange derivative operations with the companies, suffered increased cash fl ow 
pressure owing to margin calls from the BM&F. With its fi nancial health under 
suspicion, Unibanco saw itself obliged to anticipate publication of its third quarter 
results and launched a major effort to repurchase its notes (Adachi & Balarin, 
2008). According to rumors that were circulating in the fi nancial market at the 
time, the Itaú-Unibanco merger had to occur because of the cash fl ow diffi culties 
of the institutions.16
The tightening of liquidity equally affected Votorantim Bank, ranked 
ninth largest in activity and the leader in fi nancing used vehicles, due to rumors 
about its fi nancial health owing to losses of 2.2 billion reals from Votorantim 
Group companies with exchange derivative operations. With Votorantim’s 
diffi culties,17 credit in this segment was virtually paralyzed with serious 
implications for the business of new vehicles. With elevated stocks on hand, 
manufacturers interrupted production in the last two months of the year, 
affecting the whole chain of production.
The International Crisis and the Reaction of Brazil’s 
Central Bank
In Brazil, where the system of infl ation has been in effect since July 1999.18 
Central Bank’ modifi cations to the basic interest rate (SELIC rate) are meant to 
infl uence the expectations of private agents. The objective is to maintain the rate 
set by the National Monetary Council, CMN) for the calendar year (January to 
December) by monitoring expectations in relation to the evolution of infl ation, 
the interest rates and the performance of economic activity. In this strategy of 
leading monetary policy, decisions related to interest rate goals are made on the 
basis of prospective macroeconomic performance scenarios, described in Infl ation 
Reports which the monetary authority issues quarterly.
In 2008, Central Bank of Brazil led the monetary policy to maintain 
infl ation in the center of the interest rate goal. Expanded Consumer Price Index 
– IPCA – equal to 4.5%) from the assessment of having “relevant risk for an 
infl ationary scenario,” due to the persistent lack of synchronization between the 
rhythm of the expansion of demand and domestic offering. In response to the 
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strong price rise of foods through the fi rst half of this year, pulled by the high 
acceleration of agricultural commodities prices on the international market, which 
raised the accumulated IPCA in 12 months to be increasingly further from the 
center of the goal, the monetary authority began, in April, a new phase of raising 
SELIC that would only be interrupted in October, when the Brazilian economy 
had already been strongly hit by the impacts of the deepening of the global 
crisis. In four consecutive meetings, the Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM) 
raised the SELIC rate which jumped from 11.25% per year at the beginning 
of April to 13.75% on September 10. The last increase in the basic interest rate 
therefore occurred in the middle of the increased turbulence in the international 
fi nancial market and the movement of intense defl ation in international prices of 
agricultural commodities and petroleum.
The high SELIC rate goal on the eve of the fall of Lehman Brothers and 
from the transformation of the fi nancial crisis into a systemic global crisis raised 
some disbelief. Even recognizing that the central banks had a mass of information 
not available to private economic agents, the diagnosis of lack of synchronization 
between the expansion rhythm of domestic demand and the offering seemed 
incorrect in light of the various available indicators in September and/or released 
in subsequent months. GDP results from the fi rst two quarters of the year did not 
indicate acceleration in the growth rhythm of the economy, therefore belying the 
thesis that the real GDP growth was infl ationary pressures that would throttle the 
growth process.19
Up to September 2008, with the setbacks from the contagion of the 
international crisis, the Brazilian economy was seen to be registering signifi cant 
growth in the development of gross fi xed capital and industrial production. 
Leadership was noted in the production expansion of capital and durable 
goods, which grew at the rate of double digits, given the evolution of family 
consumption, which stimulated productivity investment decisions. If the 
production capacity of the economy, necessary to accommodate the growth 
of demand, was increasing, what was the reason for the persistence of the 
assessment of there being a lack of synchronization between domestic demand 
and the offering? One possible explanation resided in the instrumentation used 
by the monetary authority to evaluate the need to adjust the interest rate goal, 
from the reference point of potential GDP, the fi xation on which is absolutely 
arbitrary.
Could it be that, besides the famous conservatism and attachment to a 
mandate for price stability in the institutional regime of an infl exible infl ationary 
rate, the Central Bank of Brazil was convinced of the validity of the thesis of 
“decoupling from emerging economies?” The belief in the armor of the Brazilian 
economy, owing to the sterling execution of the “lessons from the market,” 
seemed to be a plausible explanation for the SELIC rate goal, as a complement to 
the diagnosis of the “accelerated rhythm of demand.” Thus, everything indicated 
that the BCB erred twice: once by insisting in the diagnosis that the Brazilian 
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economy was growing beyond its potential and the other by not glimpsing the 
seriousness of the ongoing deceleration in advanced economies associated with 
the movement of downshifting from the fi nancial system and from defl ation of 
assets. 
Careful of its image as guardian of Brazilian currency, COPOM chose 
to maintain the SELIC rate goal at a level of 13.75% per year in the penultimate 
meeting of 2008. The decision was applauded and anticipated by fi nancial market 
analysts and by economists and economic consultants, as Mendonça de Barros 
(2008) illustrates, on the eve of the COPOM meeting on the 28th and 29th of 
October: “the most correct and sensible decision would be a halt in the process 
of an interest increase at least until the next meeting in December. The deep cut 
in bank and commercial credit offering could be suffi cient to reduce the domestic 
demand and anchor infl ationary expectations.”
In the COPOM Minutes, released on November 7, the commitment 
to price stability was reaffi rmed, with a clear note to those who interpreted 
the halt of the high SELIC rate cycle as a sign of relaxation of monetary 
policy. Notwithstanding the evaluation that “persistence of important lack 
of synchronization between the rhythm of expansion of demand and the 
aggregated offerings continues to represent risk in an infl ationary dynamic,” the 
decision of maintaining unchanged the basic interest rate was justifi ed by the 
increase in uncertainty in relation to the “expected path of domestic spending 
in consumption and investment.” However, BCB was signaling that “in the 
event of a verifi able change in the profi le of risks that implies modifi cation of the 
prospective basic scenario outlined for infl ation by the Committee,” the monetary 
policy stance would be promptly adjusted to the circumstances.
Maintenance of the SELIC rate goal  at an elevated level, while central and 
peripheral countries signifi cantly reduced their basic interest rates, sought, on the 
one side, to avoid the damaging pass-through effects from the devaluation of the 
real to domestic prices and, on the other, to restrain the expansion of domestic 
demand. However, in the face of the seriousness of the impact of the global 
crisis on the Brazilian economy, the narrowing of monetary policy was not only 
unnecessary but unadvisable.
In a situation of elevated risk aversion and the pooling of liquidity in 
the larger institutions, maintenance of the interest rate at an elevated level was 
even more adverse to credit conditions, for companies as well as for medium 
and smaller size banks, accelerating the road of the Brazilian economy to 
recession. The deep withdrawal of domestic bank credit and the interruption of 
foreign commercial lines were more than suffi cient to reduce domestic demand 
and “anchor expectations of infl ation,” since they provoked a brusque halt to 
economic activity in the last quarter of the year. The deceleration of activity was 
so rapid and so intense that the infl ationary pressures of strong dollar appreciation 
were unconfi rmed and the IPCA decelerated, closing the year at 5.9% (0.6 
percentage points below the rate ceiling).
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The rebound of expectations for infl ation for 200920, new information 
about the deterioration of the global economy and strong indications of rapid 
deceleration of the level of domestic activity were not, however, suffi cient for the 
BCB to modify its monetary policy strategy. In the last meeting of the year, on 
the 10th and 12th of December, COPOM decided once again to maintain the basic 
interest rate goal at the level of 13.75% for the year. 
The minutes released on December 18 suggested the cut in the tax as 
COPOM’s next move. The SELIC rate goal reduction was already, however, 
“priced” by agents. Since November, the Swap DI rate of 360 days indicated 
a change in expectations by the agents, who went on to project a fall in the 
interest.
BCB’s rigidity in conducting monetary policy in the last quarter of 2008 
strongly contrasted with the actions of its colleagues in the principal advanced 
and peripheral economies. Besides the important rate cuts, various central 
banks looked to reactivate credit and improve liquidity conditions through 
increase of monetary issue. In Brazil, by contrast, unrestricted adherence to the 
monetary regime of infl ation rates aims required the monetary authority to fulfi ll 
commitment operations of public debt bonds with the banking system in order to 
prevent SELIC from effectively falling below the rate of 13.75% per year. Thus, at 
the same time that the compulsory requirements on bank deposits were reduced 
to resolve the problem of lack of liquidity and the diffi culty of refi nancing of 
smaller banks, BCB was looking to avoid expansion of the volume of currency in 
circulation in the economy.
Equally contributing to the rapid deterioration of the economic scenario 
was the inept management of the monetary authority’s liquidity “pooling.” From 
September to November, the BCB adopted a series of measures to resolve the 
problem of lack of liquidity and the diffi culty of refi nancing by smaller banks, 
postponing the rise of the compulsory portion over inter-fi nancial deposits of 
leasing companies, and promoted changes in the cash deposits, time deposits, and 
the additional compulsory regulations requirements incurred over cash deposits, 
term deposits and from savings.21  Reduction in the compulsory aliquot over 
cash deposits and the expansion of the value of the deduction for the additional 
liability aimed at helping small and medium size banks that were only rolling over 
their credit portfolios with very high cost CDB issues. On the other hand the 
purpose of the expansion of deductions associated with acquisitions of assets from 
fi nancial institutions had was to stimulate purchases of credit portfolios from 
small and medium size banks by the major banks.
Major banks, however, were uninterested in inter-bank prospect of 
fi nancial assets of less than 40% of the compulsory resources on term deposits 
for two reasons. In the fi rst place, because the compulsory resources on term 
deposits were maintained in bonds, containing, therefore, remuneration indexed 
to the SELIC rate. In the context of risk aversion, the banks preferred to maintain 
compulsory resources with income near SELIC, maintained at 13.75% by BCB 
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in October, rather than buying portfolios from smaller banks, with annual return 
around 21% (150% of CDI).
In the second place, banks considered the rules for purchase of portfolios 
severe since they forbade a co-obligation fi gure, a mechanism by which the bank 
originating the credit is kept as a guarantor after the credit is released. In other 
words, according to the rules, the purchaser banks would assume all the risk of 
the credit portfolio acquired with the compulsory resources. According to the 
banks, this would require a new analysis of the credit, creating the hesitation by 
the potential purchasers.
Thus, two days before going into effect, the acquisition rules for 
portfolios were loosened by BCB, by eliminating the prohibition of co-
obligation, introduced with the aim of guaranteeing greater control over the 
use of the incentive. In reviewing its decision, BCB clarifi ed what would be the 
most effective control, instead of forbidding redistribution of risks among banks, 
would prohibit resale of the portfolio to the credit-originating bank, as was done 
in the new version. However, these changes had little effect in motivating the 
major banks to acquire the credit portfolios of the smaller. In spite of the BCB’s 
measures, the problem of liquidity pooling deepened, with the emergence of 
more accurate information about the losses such as derivative operations from the 
exchange, which were revealed to be greater than initially supposed.
In the middle of October, the liquidity scarcity reached the highest strata 
of the medium size bank segment and also a portion of the investment funds. 
According to Guimarães (2008): “The major banks turned over their liquid assets 
overnight, earned almost 14% without doing anything, while small and medium 
banks found diffi culty in getting through the day. The entire structure of 
domestic credit was altered in less than a month, in such a way that, when there is 
fi nancing, it is much shorter and more expensive.”
Besides the rise in guarantee requirements for offering or renewing lines 
of credit, banks increased the interest rate of active operations in the last quarter 
of 2008. This high derived as much from the increase in the banks’ cost of 
rising funds as from the rise of the risk spread by the increase in uncertainty, 
aggravated by the losses derived from operations with dollar derivatives, 
estimated at US$25 billion, which involved three thousand companies, many of 
them with income exclusively in reals and without the availability of liquid assets 
to pay off one-time and full demand contract losses.22 Banks renegotiated loans 
associated with dollar derivatives to avoid the collapse of these companies, but 
raised the risk premiums. 
On October 13, BCB once again changed the rules for compulsory 
collection on term deposits, raising the percentage of the compulsory from 
40% to 70% that could go to the banks for the purchase of other banks’ credit 
portfolios. In the same way, it changed the eligible assets for buying inter-bank 
operations with compulsory resources, authorizing bond acquisitions from 
investment fund portfolios.
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 23 (66), 2009138
On the same day BCB increased the compulsory requirement exemption 
from 700 million to 2 billion reals [US$ 324.80 million and US$ 928 million 
at the exchange rate of 2.1551 of 15 October 2008] equivalent to 15% of the 
resources held in term deposits. Since only ten banks held more than 13 billion 
reals in term deposits, at the beginning of this norm taking effect, only they 
continued to be subject to the requirement of this withdrawal. In order to also 
improve the liquidity condition of medium size banks, BCB changed the rules 
for the additional compulsory on cash deposits, term and savings deposits. The 
exemption limit for these operations was raised from 700 million to one billion 
reals, which freed nearly all medium size banks from this requirement.
Although in the second half of October innumerable portfolio purchases – 
consigned credit, leasing, vehicle fi nancing and loans to medium size companies 
– had been announced by the major banks, closed business only reached 1.5 
billion reals out of a potential for 30 billion reals [US$ 709.2 billion and US$ 
14.2 billion at the exchange rate of 2.1151 of 30 October 2008], causing the 
monetary authority to increase pressure on the major banks (Cruz, 2008).23 
Thus, with the aim of forcing the major banks to acquire fi nancial assets from 
the medium and small and to disperse liquidity in inter-banking, BCB promoted 
a change, on October 30, in the form of  implementing withdrawal of term 
deposits, establishing that 70% of that liability would be maintained in cash and 
no longer exclusively in public bonds. This new form of withdrawal, which went 
into effect on November 15, imposed a penalty on banks that would not use their 
compulsory resources to acquire the fi nancial assets of smaller banks, since the in-
cash compulsory withdrawal increased the cost of the opportunity to leave behind 
the unused capital.
In producing this measure, however, BCB erred in its evaluation of the 
impact on the management of the public debt, since the banks did not use federal 
public bonds to comply with the 70% of the liability of compulsory withdrawals. 
Thus less than two weeks after the publishing of Newsletter n. 3.417 by BCB 
the CMN changed the rules for additional liability compliance which affected 
cash, term and savings deposits (Resolution. 3.643 from November 13, 2008). 
After December 1st the withdrawals would no longer be made in cash, with 
remuneration following the SELIC rate, so that they would be fulfi lled in Federal 
public bonds indexed to SELIC. With this change, CMN attempted to assure 
that the demand for federal public bonds would not be affected by the change in 
the withdrawal rule for term deposit. 
The strategy for change in the percentage of compulsory withdrawals 
adopted by the BCB was innocuous, given the preference for liquidity by banks 
and the possibility of the liquid, profi table and very low risk investments in public 
bonds, the private banks simply didn’t expand credit. Liquidity only began 
to fl ow again when, in March, 2009, the Government decided to guarantee, 
through the Guaranteed Credit Fund, bank deposit receipts (RDB) up to 20 
million reals [US$ 8.6 million at the exchange rate of 2.3297 of 30 March 
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2009] per investor, without daily liquidity, issued at a minimum six month and 
maximum fi ve year term, with a ceiling for the fi nancial institution’s collection 
at a maximum value of 5 billion reals [US$ 2.1 billion at the exchange rate of 
2.3297 of 30 March 2009].24
In order to ease the contraction of credit by the private banking sector, the 
public fi nancial institutions expanded and/or created new credit lines. If it were 
not for the anti-cyclical action of the public banks, above all BNDES and CEF, 
the recession of the Brazilian economy in the last quarter of 2008 would have 
been even more dramatic.
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Notes
1  This article has benefi ted from close reading by Marcos Antonio Macedo Cintra, whom 
I thank for commentaries and suggestions. Errors and omissions are entirely the author’s 
responsibility.
2  The notion of competition as a dynamic process, present in Marx and Schumpeter, 
has been adopted here, in which the market opportunities are continually exploited by 
businessmen in their quest for greater income, in counterpart to static competition as a 
market structure predominant in economic theory. In banking the process of capitalistic 
competition takes on specifi c traits, owing to the specifi c nature of banks and the unique 
role that they perform as raisers of credit currency. On this point see Freitas (1997).
3  This movement was conditioned by a full conjunction of macroeconomic, structural and 
regulatory factors. For greater detail, see Freitas (2007a).
4  On the recent credit cycle and its determiners, see, among others, Cintra (2006), Oliveira 
(2006) e Freitas (2007b).
5  The regulation of consigned credit from pay slips of active and inactive workers in 
December 2003 provided an additional impulse for the expansion of credit to individuals. 
Introduced in Provisory Measure n.130 – on September 7, 2003, later converted into 
Law n.10.820, on December 17, 2003 –, the modality of consigned installment loans 
grew dizzily, reaching a volume of 9.7 billion reals in December 2003 [equivalent to US$ 
3.3 billion at the exchange rate of 2.8892 of 30 December 2003]. Since then, consigned 
credit has come to be continually expanded in its portion in the total of personal credit, 
jumping from 35.5% in December 2003 to 62% in June 2008. It can be seen as an 
innovation sponsored by the Government, with the aim of honoring reduction in the cost 
of the loans, which represented a new business opportunity that the smaller banks knew 
how to take advantage of, winning important slices of this new segment (Freitas, 2007a).
6  By contrast, cooling off of credit to individuals was noticed for the fi rst time in the 
present cycle owing to the lesser dynamism of loans for acquiring goods and personal 
credit, most of all in consigned goods. The rise in Financial Operations Tax (IOF) that 
began on direct consumer fi nancing, the reduction from 30% to 20% by the INSS in the 
discount limit for loan payments to retirees in January, as well as consecutive increases in 
the SELIC rate between April and September explain why these modalities, which were 
leading the expansion of credit with free resources, lost ground in 2008. In the case of 
consigned credit, the narrower margins due to the elevation of SELIC and the problems 
with anticipated credit liquidation caused various banks to review their operational 
strategies in this segment.
7  For Brazilian capital market performance, see the Technical Note from the Conjuncture 
Group O mercado de capitais brasileiro em 2008: os impactos da crise fi nanceira. Available 
at: <http:\\www.fundap.sp.gov.br>.
8  On the rise of CDB with daily liquidity, see Carvalho (2008).
9  For more details about the workings of exchange market derivatives, see Prates & Fahri 
(2008). On loan operations linked to dollar derivative contracts see, among others, 
Lucchesi et al. (2008), Brandimarte et al. (2008), Balthazar (2008) e Adachi (2008).
10 For the impact of the fi nancial crisis on national currencies of peripheral countries, see 
Prates & Cunha (2009).
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11 According to Safatle & Galvão (2008), the renewal rate of ACC operations that 
surpassed 100% before the escalation of the foreign crisis fell to 25% in the third week of 
September, while the terms “that were 360 day, were reduced to 90 days or, in the best 
cases, 180 days.”
12 Concerning the effect of the contagion of the global crisis in capital fl ow for Brazil and 
the commercial Brazilian balance sheet, see Iedi (2009).
13 Concerning this point, see the Technical Note from the Conjuncture Group Panorama 
das economias emergentes: o efeito-contágio da crise. Available at: <http:\\www.fundap.
sp.gov.br>.
14 Owing to the public debt management model, which combines the monetary market of 
public bonds, and the existence of public debt bond indexed to the basic interest rate, 
banks in Brazil exerted a preference for liquidity acquiring Federal public bonds, which 
assured them very low risk, high income and ease in relocation of portfolios (Lopreato 
2007; Freitas, 1997; Oliveira, 2009). The institutional characteristics of Brazilian public 
debt management at least in part explain the diffi culty confronted by BCB in acting to 
resolve the problem of inter-bank liquidity pooling, from seeing itself obligated to review 
decisions on withdrawal of compulsory term deposits. This point will be discussed more 
fully further on.
15 Small and medium size banks were also affected by the security fl ight of institutional 
investors, and the major individual investors that, taking advantage of the CDB daily 
liquidity, transferred their applications to institutions considered more secure, such as 
public banks and the major private banks.
16 Itaú and Unibanco announced the merger on November 3, 2008 through the 
constitution of a holding company by which the controlling families of the two banks 
would each comprised 50%. This form of transaction surprised the market and fed 
rumors that the Itaú’s liquid assets had been much more affected by margin calls than 
supposed and the agreement was therefore more favorable to the Moreira Salles family.
17 In order to avoid the collapse of Votorantim, the government authorized its purchase by 
BB. On this basis, on October 21 the Provisionary Measure n. 443 was published which 
authorized BB and CEF to acquire participation in fi nancial institutions based in Brazil. 
Begun at the end of October, the negotiations were concluded on January 9 with the 
acquisition by BB of 49.99% of voting stock and 50% of joint stock, leaving control of 
the institution in the hands of the Ermírio de Moraes family. The deal was closed for 4.2 
billion reals. See Lethbridge (2008) and Rocha (2009).
18 Concerning the system of infl ation goals, see the Technical Note from the Conjuncture 
Group Regime de meta de infl ação em perspectiva comparada. Available at: <http:\\www.
fundap.sp.gov.br>.
19 Real GDP growth in the second quarter of 2008 was 6.1% by comparison to the same 
quarter of the previous year, a close variation to that registered in the two previous 
quarters: 5.9% in the fi rst quarter and 6.2% in the fourth quarter of 2007. Concerning 
this point, see Technical Note from the Conjuncture Group A evolução da atividade 
econômica e is impactos da crise fi nanceira. Available at: <http:\\www.fundap.sp.gov.br>.
20 In the report on infl ation published in December 2008, new infl ation projection 
indicated a variation of 6.2% of IPCA in 2008 and 4.7% in 2009, while the collected 
market expectations by Manager and Investor Relations (Gerin) of BCB on December 
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19 pointed to a variation of 6% for the IPCA in 2008 and 5% in 2009. Although above 
the center of the goal, these projections were within the CMN margin of error of 2 pp, 
established by CMN.
21 Between September 23 and November 13, BCB promoted ten changes to the compulsory 
regulation. Some of these changes altered recently completed modifi cations, suggesting 
that the monetary authority had not appropriately evaluated the seriousness of the 
problems of fi nancial system illiquidity.
22 Concerning the estimates of losses from exchange-based derivatives operations, see, 
among others, Balthazar (2008) and Bautzer (2008).
23 On October 17, more than 18 credit portfolios had been bought by the largest private 
banks (Bradesco, Itaú-Unibanco) and public banks (Nossa Caixa, CEF and BB), with 
remuneration of up to 150% of the CDI (Carvalho & Ribeiro, 2008). On October 30, 
Durão (2008) reported that, after a period of suffocation, the position of the small 
and medium size banks began to be normalized, owing to the concession of credit 
operations, whose cost declined from 150% to 125% of the CDI, and from adjusted 
operational agreements between banks to purchase new credit originating from small and 
medium size banks.
24 The Bank Deposit Receipt (RDB) with the special guarantee of the Credit Fund 
Guarantor (FGC) was instituted by the National Monetary Council on March 26 2009 
(Resolution n. 3.692). The maximum value that each institution could issue RDB 
was limited to the total CDB issued up to June 30, 2008 or up to twice the reference 
assets. However, on 23 April, in an extraordinary meeting, CMN decided to include 
in the calculation of the RDB holding limit the exchange of titles issued by fi nancial 
institutions. (Resolution n. 3.717).
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ABSTRACT – This article discusses the impacts of the international crisis on the 
Brazilian economy, with emphasis on the virtual paralysis of the domestic banking credit 
market that has occurred since September 2008. It argues that the dynamics of banking 
competition led to the emergence of high-risk practices. The destabilizing potential of 
these practices came to light when the aggravation of the international fi nancial crisis 
and its contagion in peripheral countries such as Brazil caused a reversal of expectations. 
Generalized conservative behavior by banks during the retraction phase was exacerbated 
in Brazil by the relatively short credit cycle and by the liquidity, profi tability and low 
risk of public bonds, allowing a rapid recomposition of portfolios. The Central Bank, 
sticking to its mandate as the guardian of price stability, failed to move to mitigate the 
deceleration of productive activities that resulted from the contraction of credit.
KEYWORDS: Systemic crisis, Liquidity preference, Banks, Credit crunch, Brazil.
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